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Discussant's Response to "Internal Control: Progress
and Perils"
Andrew D. Bailey, Jr*
University of Arizona

Introduction
This comment is organized around the Winters and Guy paper and the COSO
(Committee of Sponsoring Organizations) Internal Control-Integrated
Framework project [COSO, 1992; Winters and Guy, 1992], I was a member of
the Project Advisory Council to COSO, Guidance and Oversight. This group
included representatives from each of the COSO participating organizations,
FEI (Financial Executive Institute), IIA (Institute of Internal Auditors), IMA
(Institute of Management Accountants), AICPA (American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants), and AAA (American Accounting Association). As the
AAA representative, I participated in all COSO Advisory Council deliberations.
As is the habit of the AAA, I was not authorized to speak for the Association.
The AAA Executive Committee recently endorsed the private sector initiative
represented by the internal control framework project, but did not endorse the
specific contents of the report. Discussions with the AAA were still in progress
when this paper was submitted. Any comments made by me concerning the
results of the framework study are mine and not those of the AAA or other
COSO Advisory Council members.

Background
Some background, as I interpret it, on the evolution of the COSO Internal
Control project may be of use. In developing the COSO response to the
Treadway recommendations concerning an integrated definition of internal control, it was decided to develop the project within the existing FERF (Financial
Executive Research Foundation) research framework. The usual research
process involves a task force, such as the COSO Project Advisory Council, but
drawn from FEI members. Ordinarily a FERF project team is in direct charge of
their project and accepts direction from the task force as it deems reasonable. It
is the project team's option to reject advice and FERF's option to publish or not
publish the resulting report. Given the nature of this project and the perception
by many that the internal control project was essential to providing a basis for
potential legislation and/or regulation in the area, the COSO Advisory Council
wanted to take a much more direct hand in setting direction for the resulting
report. The initial relations between the Coopers & Lybrand project team and
The author wants to thank the members of the COSO Advisory Council for their valuable input on
an earlier version of this paper. Interpretations remain my own.
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the COSO Advisory Council required some effort due to these circumstances.
The Coopers & Lybrand team, quite reasonably, considered all COSO Advisory
Council input as just that — advisory. They chose to accept some, but certainly
not all, of the advice. The COSO Advisory Council found this difficult to deal
with; however, an amicable set of protocols was developed over time.
Changed Project Management
During this period, I believed that both the Coopers & Lybrand project team
and the COSO Advisory Council anticipated that the final product would be a
FERF monograph. However, approximately halfway through the effort it was
concluded that a more extensive public disclosure effort than originally planned
would enhance the possibility of general acceptance of the project results.
Because of the advocacy implications, FERF withdrew from the management of
the project. As a result, no monograph would be published by FERF.
Discussions following this decision focused on the means of developing the
COSO project in a form more like that of a standard setting effort. The resulting
public exposure process can be characterized as a standard setting effort; however, as COSO has no standard setting authority, whether the results will constitute a standard will depend solely upon the degree of acceptance this document
generates.

The COSO Framework Study
The COSO Framework is premised on the idea that internal control is essential to the efficient and effective operations of a business, reliable external
financial reporting (note that COSO only went this far on the topic of external
reporting) and compliance with laws and regulations. It is also influenced by a
belief that legislators and regulators have misconceptions about the value of
internal controls or, at least, about the value of external reporting on internal
controls. The concern with legislators and regulators explains some of the positions adopted by COSO.
Serious questions arise as to the importance of internal controls and reporting
on internal controls. First, is internal control necessary to meet the operations,
reporting and compliance objectives of a firm? If we can rely on even the simplest biological analogies to the marketplace, survival of the fittest, we can pretty well accept that internal control is important to the management of a firm. As
a corollary, we can assume that some form of internal reporting will take place
on this topic. Virtually all successful firms commit some fraction of their
resources to development, maintenance, and reporting on internal control systems. A virtually unqualified "yes" seems to be appropriate with respect to this
point. How much firms commit is, at this time, based on a firm by firm
cost/benefit analysis, taking into consideration current mandated regulations.
Less obvious is the answer to the second question: Is external reporting on internal control useful? There is little empirical evidence to support the demand for
external reports on internal controls other than from legislative and regulatory
bodies. Winters and Guy [1992, p. 183] contend that "Those who advocate
reports on internal control usually cite two major benefits...a behavioral
effect...[and an] information content [benefit]."
The COSO Framework is composed of four separate volumes: Executive
Summary; Framework Study; Management Reporting to External Parties; and
Tools. This structure seems quite obvious with the possible exception of the
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separation of the Management Reporting to External Parties from the
Framework Study. The separation is the result of COSO advisory members'
deliberations on the topic of external reporting and significant contradictory
commentary on the same topic from those receiving the exposure draft. The
contradictory commentary, disagreements and concerns are, in my opinion,
reflected in the final document in a number of ways: external reporting is not
required for good internal control; only external financial reporting is addressed
in any substantive and explicit way by the report; and external auditing is not
given much explicit prominence in any of the volumes. This latter point may
reflect management's concern for expanding audit fees and a general feeling
that the audit adds little value in the circumstances addressed by the report. The
public accounting participants in the process would undoubtedly not accept the
lack of value added position; however, concern for extended legal exposure, a
desire to make progress on a common set of definitions and criteria and the
inclusion of a volume specifically addressing external reporting issues may
influence them to accept the report.
Summary of the COSO Documents
The following comments are based on the COSO report, Internal ControlIntegrated Framework, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission, Revised Draft, February 1992, revised based on recommendations of the April 13, 1992 COSO Advisory Committee meeting [COSO,
1992]. Subsequent changes are reflected where they are known to be part of the
planned revisions.
Throughout this paper I have drawn very heavily (in fact, as much as possible) on the actual words used in the COSO documents. I have not used quotation marks or page references, as they would be distracting. However, subject to
my errors in transcription or subsequent COSO changes, statements attributed to
COSO use COSO's words. As you will have noted above, I have also drawn
from SAS 55 and the Winters and Guy paper [AICPA, 1988; COSO, 1992;
Winters and Guy, 1992], In these cases, I have endeavored to use page and
paragraph references as well as quotation marks. These quotations and observations are inserted at the points where they seem to bear on the COSO volumes
discussed. I have endeavored to clearly distinguish my opinions, which are mine
alone.
a. Objectives of Framework Study: COSO established two objectives for its
integrated framework study, (emphasis added) to:
• Establish a common definition serving the needs of different parties.
• Provide a standard against which business and other entities—large or
small, in the public or private sector, for profit or not—can assess their
control systems and determine to improve them.
b. Success in meeting these objectives requires:
• A common and generally accepted definition of internal control.
• A generally accepted set of standards for assessing whether an organization's internal control system meets effectiveness standards.
The COSO document does present a definition and standards, but it is too
early to know whether either will be accepted as the common definition and
standards for internal control. There was certainly a good deal of discussion
about the definition and standards among all parties to the process. Many of the
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exposure draft comments have been incorporated into the definition and standards. These comments were incorporated, both to improve the definition and
standards and also in an attempt to assure the general acceptance necessary to
meet the COSO study objectives. Without additional exposure efforts, one
could expect continuing dissatisfaction with specific aspects of the definition.
Some of these disagreements would clearly be a matter of editorial choices, e.g.,
where the wording is not that used by a particular organization in its current literature. These disagreements are unlikely to persist if the COSO framework
gains any significant degree of prominence. Other matters may prove more substantive but will have to await attempts to apply the COSO framework in the
field to existing and newly arising problems, e.g., external compliance reporting
in the banking industry. Disagreements about the breadth or narrowness of the
definition and standards (both exist) are unlikely to be resolved at this late date.
The broader definition adopted by COSO had the predominant level of support
from both COSO participants and those responding to the report drafts.
It is too early to know whether the COSO framework will become the standard of application. However, there are forces that encourage its adoption. The
Congress and its regulatory arms may find it a useful point of departure when
considering new legislation or regulation in the internal control reporting arena.
There are already indications that at least part of the COSO document will be
included in pending regulations. The private sector participants clearly hope for
such reliance and for an understanding on the part of the lawmakers that the
COSO framework also addresses the limits of lawmaker requests. Some private
sector participants hope that it will act as a brake on regulators' desires for additional mandated public reporting and auditing. At the same time, the public
accounting sector may find that the COSO framework provides them with a
ready marketing tool. However, while there are incentive compatible reasons to
expect acceptance by many of the principals involved, this acceptance is only
likely to be retained among the participants based on early successes or failures
in application. Winters and Guy say [p. 180]:
Agreement about what internal control is...may be attainable. For example, regulatory agencies...have indicated they will adopt the COSO report
as the standard against which both the required management and auditor
assessments of internal control effectiveness...should be judged...imbuing
the COSO report with 'general acceptance'....
More experience implementing the COSO report is needed...before its
success can be evaluated....
Realistically, I believe that the COSO framework will become an integral
part of the internal control literature for the next five to ten years. During that
time events will determine its survival as a seminal work or as a useful effort
needing elaboration, extension or revision. In any case, it will have set the agenda for consideration and action and moved the internal control discussion forward.
Definition
COSO defined internal control [COSO Advisory Committee meeting,
February 1992; revised based on April 13, 1992] as follows (emphasis added):
Internal control is a process, effected by an entity's board of directors,
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management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
• Reliability of external financial reporting.
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
According to SAS 55, Para 6:
An entity's internal control structure consists of the policies and procedures established to provide reasonable assurance that specific entity
objectives will be achieved. (Note: The SAS focus of interest is on those
parts of the internal control structure "...relevant to an audit of the entity's
financial statements.")
The categories of internal control form the expanded basis of the COSO definition. The explicit incorporation of operations and compliance categories substantially expands the usual ASB (Auditing Standard Board) definition. While
SAS 55 broadened the definition of internal control and eliminated the accounting and administrative controls distinction and as a result recognized the importance of operations, SAS 55 only addresses the context of reliable external
financial reporting and the planning of an audit for that purpose. The COSO
definition envisions these categories as important in their own right, perhaps
even more important than the more limited outlook suggested by the ASB.
COSO recognizes that there is no sharp line delineating these categories and
that consideration of any category will likely involve consideration of aspects of
another category. COSO also recognizes that the methods of measurement
needed to address these categories are not equally well developed. They do not
consider the measurement problem to be sufficient to suggest that the categories
should be ignored or de-emphasized. Those concerned with the regulators' apparently lesser concern for the limitation of measurement in these areas may
continue to be concerned about the inclusion of these categories.
According to Winters and Guy [p. 180-181]:
... Such a categorization...creates a perception that internal control components within these categories are clearly identifiable and distinguishable
and that experience and expertise in applying the COSO criteria [see
Components below] is equally well-developed for each of these categories.
This perception is not valid and, although the COSO report attempts to
dispel the inference, our experience with numerous regulatory requests for
auditor services on internal control demonstrates that the misperception is
common....
Regulatory initiatives calling for such implementation are fast outpacing
our ability to provide those services....
While the broader definition had the preponderance of support, some of
those commenting on the definition felt that it was too broad to the point of
defining not internal control, but management. Others felt that it should be narrowed to encompass only financial statement preparation. There was a good
deal of concern that the broad definition would extend the litigation exposure of
anyone associated with the design, functioning or reporting on internal control,
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and that it would encourage regulators to extend their reach in this area.
Components
Integral to the definition are five interrelated components. The drafters of the
COSO framework indicate that these components are derived from the way
management runs its business. The definitions below are drawn from the related
chapters in the Framework document. I have, as noted earlier, used the document's wording.
Control Environment - Control environment factors include: the integrity,
ethical values and competence of the entity's people; management's philosophy
and operating style; the way management assigns authority and responsibility
and organizes and develops its people; and the attention and direction provided
by the board of directors.
Winters and Guy point out [p. 181]:
Another concern about the COSO criteria is that certain components may
be so subjective as to not be susceptible to reasonably consistent estimation or measurement. Those components most often cited include integrity, ethical values and management competence.
These are actually all a part of a single component, Control Environment. They
also say, [p. 185]:
...[T]he expanded definition [of internal control in SAS 55] brought the
control environment and the accounting system directly into the scope of
the auditor's consideration. ...[t]hese components are much more closely
associated with the primary causes of financial statement misstatements
than are control over individual transactions.
Given the above two statements by Winters and Guy, I am not sure why the first
comment is offered as the concepts are already in SAS 55. Do Winters and Guy
mean that SAS 55 already allows auditors to rely on overly subjective inputs to
too great a degree? This point has been argued elsewhere by Morton and Felix
[1991] and Kinney, et. al., [1990].
Risk Assessment - Risk assessment involves identification and analysis of
relevant risks to achievement of the objectives as a basis for determining how
risk should be managed.
Winters and Guy comment that [p. 184]:
...Even more modernistic and intriguing are questions about the meaning
of control risk in an audit of internal control—that is, what does control
risk mean and how should it be considered when an auditor is engaged to
express an opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting, compliance, or operations?
I am unclear as to the uniqueness of the problem as it applies to financial reporting as this concept seems quite well established, i.e., the probability of material
error occurring and not being identified and corrected by the control system.
With respect to operations and compliance, the problem relates to the materiality measurement concept discussed elsewhere and the definition of error. In
both of these cases, Winters and Guy have a point.
Control Activities - Control activities are policies and procedures (which are
the actions of people to implement the policies) to help ensure that management
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directives identified as necessary to address risks are carried out. Control activities can be divided into three categories, based on the nature of the entity's
objectives to which they relate: operations; financial information reporting; or
compliance.
Information and Communication - Pertinent information must be identified,
captured and communicated to people in a form and timeframe that enables
them to carry out their responsibilities. Information systems produce the reports
containing operational, financial and compliance-related information that make
it possible to run and control the business. They deal not only with internally
generated data, but also with information about external events, activities, and
conditions necessary to informed business decision making and external reporting.
Monitoring - Internal control systems need to be monitored — a process that
assesses the quality of the system's performance over time. This is accomplished through ongoing monitoring activities, separate evaluations, or a combination of the two.
The tests of controls discussion in Chapter 6, Monitoring, implies that the
"actual functioning" of a system can be established by discussion with personnel. This is recognized to be a weak statement of the evidence required to establish "actual" functioning and likely to be a satisfactory approach in only rare
circumstances. In my opinion, it allows too much evidential weight on discussion with personnel.
SAS 55, Para 51 states: "Inquiry alone generally will not provide sufficient
evidential matter to support a conclusion about the effectiveness of design or
operation of a specific control procedure." The use of the word "generally" is,
in my opinion, a weak statement similar to that in the COSO report. Also, SAS
55, Para 8 says:
For purposes of an audit of financial statements, an entity's internal control structure consists of the three following elements: The control environment; The accounting system; and Control procedures.
Note that, from above, it would appear that the SAS and COSO Control environments are pretty much the same. However, the SAS Accounting system
and Control procedures appear to be included primarily in the COSO Control
activities. Clearly, the SAS envisions Risk Assessment, Information and
Communication and Monitoring as part of internal control. This is seen in SAS
55, Para 29: "Control risk should be assessed in terms of financial statement
assertions."
The original exposure draft of the framework included a larger number of
components. Based on exposure draft responses, several new aspects of internal
control were added to the components and the components were reduced in
number. It would appear that COSO has incorporated virtually all of the exposure draft commentary in this area. Remaining debate seems to be focused more
on presentation and integration within the model. Those who feel that the components should be incorporated directly into the definition in order to produce,
in their view, a more complete stand alone definition will be disappointed.
All components apply to all categories and are, in that sense, an integral part
of the definition of internal controls.
The Framework takes the position that all components must be present to
have an effective internal control system in each of the category areas. It is rec198

ognized that some trade-off may exist as to the strength of one component versus another and still have an effective internal control system, but all components must be present. It is hard to imagine an entity that is devoid of some aspect of each of these components.
Effectiveness
Internal control can be judged effective in each of the three categories,
respectively, if the board of directors and management have reasonable assurance that (emphasis added):
• They understand the extent to which the entity's operations objectives
are being achieved.
• Financial reports are being prepared reliably.
• Applicable laws and regulations are being complied with.
Commentary on this aspect of the study tended to concentrate on the meaning of reasonable assurance as it applied to the reliability and compliance categories. Those with a legal background tended to be concerned because of the
meanings applied to these terms in the law. COSO decided to continue with
these commonly used terms and to rely on explanatory materials to make their
meanings, in this context, clear. Some expressed concern about the focus on
boards and management assurance as opposed to third party assurances. As
third party assurances come only with external reporting, COSO decided to
address that issue only where third party reporting was discussed, i.e., external
financial reporting.
As stated in SAS 55, Para 17:
Whether an internal control structure policy or procedure has been placed
in operation is different from its operating effectiveness...This Statement
does not require the auditor to obtain knowledge about operating effectiveness as part of the understanding of the internal control structure.
Further in Para 29, SAS 55 states that:
Assessing control risk is the process of evaluating the effectiveness of an
entity's internal control structure policies and procedures in preventing or
detecting material misstatements in the financial statements.

OPERATION
CONTROL
ENVIRONMENT
RISK
ASSESSMENT
CONTROL
ACTIVITIES
INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION
MONITORING
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COMPLIANCE

EXTERNAL
REPORTING

Internal Control Model - Categories And Components
While not presented in the currently revised document, an internal control
model is implicit in the above (the model was developed and presented to the
COSO Advisory Committee by the drafters and may appear in a future draft of
the report). I will present a slightly adapted model framework from that derived
directly from the above and discuss its relationship to the current COSO
Framework document.
Note that the internal control definition categories form the columns of the
matrix and the five components the rows. In the current document the column
labeled above as "External Reporting" is labeled "Reliability of financial reporting." I have used the more general, "External Reporting" because I believe that
it provides a more internally consistent model and allows for all forms of external reporting. There may be a bit of confusion about my apparent switch to
"external" reporting as a header in that the definition does not include the word
"external" in the financial reporting category. Thus, the financial reporting category refers to all financial reporting, internal and external. However, other
forms of internal and external reporting considered by COSO are a part of the
information and communications component. Treating the financial reporting
category as primarily a concern for external reports seems, to me, more appropriate and consistent for model purposes. It also seems appropriate to do so
because of the external reporting emphasis given this category in the separate
volume on the matter. The following discussion as it relates to financial reporting has an external reporting orientation.
Winters and Guy believe that "[I]nternal control theory and applications have
progressed,...." [p. 177] It is not clear to me that we have made much progress
to a normative theory of internal control beyond general control theory as
appearing in the industrial engineering literature. We do have some conceptual
models, such as the one above, that form the basis for developing criteria for
internal control. These are descriptive theories of internal control derived largely from the observation of practice.
The rationale behind the three categories can be developed along several different lines of thought. When approaching it from the COSO Framework writers' point of view, the three categories are considered in terms of an entity's
conditions for continued economic existence and success. The operations category represents the need to transform inputs into outputs in an economic manner that will satisfy the customer's needs. The compliance category may be
viewed as meeting the essential restrictions placed on an entity by various sanctioned governmental and voluntary external entities. Where inability to supply
the customer market will result in failure through competitive market forces,
lack of compliance with critical laws and regulations can result in entity failure
even when some parts of the market are clamoring for the product. External
reporting may be required under a variety of circumstances. The one most obviously envisioned by the current COSO document and present practice is external financial reporting. In a financial market environment like our own, obtaining the necessary capital to permit continuing operations requires communications with external capital providers. Others may also use external financial reports for purposes such as credit setting, contract negotiations, etc., and
these are envisioned by COSO as well. The broader category I have used,
"External Reporting," also envisions external reporting not currently considered
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commonplace, e.g., external reports to bank regulators, external reports of compliance with environmental laws and regulations, etc. The COSO Framework
document considers that external reports other than external financial reports
reside in either the operating or compliance categories of the definition through
the component "Information and Communication." They also believe that the
inclusion of only the more limited external financial reporting category will better retain and highlight the link to the separate volume on external financial
reporting. Thus while the COSO form of the model allows for other than financial external reports, it does so only indirectly.
The above comments address materials embodied in Chapter 1 of the COSO
Framework document. The balance of the COSO statement is an elaboration on
the above definition, components and effectiveness statement. Five additional
chapters are devoted (one each) to the five components, a sixth chapter to limitations of internal controls and a final chapter to the roles and responsibilities of
the various parties within an entity.

Management Reporting to External Parties
This section deals only with external financial reporting. The issues of external reporting on operations and compliance are not dealt with by the COSO
Framework.
There is a major discontinuity between the process orientation of the
Framework document and the state orientation adopted in this volume. The
Framework's definition of internal control as a process seems to be appropriate
and creates no problem until we encounter reporting issues. In that context, two
problems arise. First, there is the matter of the current level of technology and
cost of auditing a process. This problem exists for both internal and external
reports, but is probably most significant for external reports where an audit
might be considered. Second, particularly in an external report, the degree of
exposure when expressing an opinion on the continuing operation of a process
is perceived to be more extensive than expressing an opinion on the point-intime state of a system. There can be little argument that as no actions actually
occur at a point-in-time, more exposure with respect to actions exists if one
expresses an opinion covering a period of actual system operation. These issues
become evident in the external reporting volume where point-in-time reporting
is selected, i.e., a report on a state of the process but not the process itself.
The volume indicates that users may be most interested in whether the system was functioning and will function in the future. However, the volume also
indicates that management and/or auditors cannot provide much evidence on
either. With respect to the future, there can be no question that evidence is not
obtainable; with respect to the past, the evidence is obtainable. However, in the
context of this volume, even if obtained and indicative of a material weakness,
it would be reported only if management had not corrected and tested the
change.
Winters and Guy [pp. 186-188] argue that the behavioral and information
content benefits of reporting on internal controls do not flow to external financial reporting because if a material error occurs, it can be corrected and the
external financial reports will be reliable; this may miss the point or simply be a
matter of definition. They are certainly correct that the final product of the successful audit will be reliable financial statements even if the internal control
system did not produce them as desired. However, in the interim, the failure of
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an internal control system to produce such statements may be costly in terms of
decisions made with faulty information or losses incurred through resource dissipation. Perhaps the poor decision and resource loss issues are really an operations issue. This is the position of the COSO Framework. Nevertheless, I do not
agree with the statement by Winters and Guy [p. 188] that "... for the financial
reporting category, the argument boils down to which type of information is
least costly to provide." Reports on internal control provide different information about the firm than the output contained in the financial statements. It
remains an empirical issue as to whether this different information is worth the
cost of production. I see the internal control reporting on financial issues in
pretty much the same light as that on operations and compliance. In all three
areas internal reports are provided to management; in all three areas there is different information than would be provided by an output report only. In all three
areas there are, internally, actions that can be taken to create a more effective
and efficient environment; in all three areas, externally, there is very little
empirical evidence as to the demand for reports on these matters. In all three
areas, a conceptual argument can be made that the information would provide
another means of evaluating management performance and thus in making decisions on retention and rewards for management. I would agree with Winters and
Guy [p. 189] that "In our view, not much progress has been made in resolving
the questions concerning the relative merits of reports on internal control versus
reports on output," although I do not see it as a versus issue.
Unfortunately, whether by intent or not, and as noted by Winters and Guy,
the COSO report reads like an attempt to avoid ever having to report a material
weakness:
Another peril arises because the report uses the concept of a material
weakness to separate effective from ineffective internal control. Using this
measure causes two problems. First, no conceptual or empirical construct
of a material weakness exists for either internal control over compliance or
operations.... In the absence of sound definitions...such evaluations will be
subject to extreme variations in consistency and usefulness.
Even though an accepted material weakness concept exists for internal
control over financial reporting, it also poses complications. There are
strong disincentives to concluding that such weaknesses exist. [pp. 181]
...If the concept of material weaknesses, as prescribed in both the COSO
report and the proposed attestation standard, results in the virtual absence
of material weaknesses..., all reports will look alike. These boilerplate
reports are not likely to have much information content and, instead, serve
only as a basis for litigation.... [p. 190]
The position adopted on reporting material weaknesses is supported as a constructive focus designed to encourage monitoring and correction throughout the
period. Admittedly, it does encourage correction and "testing" on a "timely"
basis. However, it assumes very little value in the disclosures exercise, but provides no evidence to support that view. Winters and Guy assert that [p. 189]:
...We believe...that internal control reports are much more useful for
these [specified] parties than for the general public, and less likely to create perils for management and their auditors.
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Reports to the general public are much more hazardous than those to
specific users; hazardous to the public, the entity, and its auditors.... At
most members of the investing public might alter their investment
decisions....
The reasons given by them are the usual "it will confuse the public" statements.
The COSO document asserts that external reporting is not an element of
internal control, but provides no evidence that such reports do not contribute to
internal control. The document also asserts that point-in-time reporting is, in
general, most appropriate, but offers no evidence. Further, the document specifically asserts that point-in-time reporting meets the needs of security holders
and other external parties, but provides no evidence.
The discussion concerning interim reporting reduces, in my opinion, to
reporting on system design for interim reporting, a point of view rejected when
discussing the need to report on effectiveness. This is perhaps a bit too harsh a
judgment, but it definitely reads as an attempt to avoid reporting any material
weaknesses.

Conclusions
What can we expect the debate over internal controls to be like during the
coming years? First, the debate over the definition of internal control is not
over. Despite COSO's valiant attempt, the lack of a theory of internal control
beyond that found in engineering control theory assures that the debate will
continue. COSO has provided one model with its categories and components of
internal control. Like many other models, it does not derive from some fundamental postulates but rather from a studied consideration of what occurs in the
business environment. This does not make these models useless. In fact, the
very lack of a theory makes them particularly important for the improvement of
practice as well as for their potential contribution to the eventual creation of a
more fundamental theory.
Second, there are even more pragmatic reasons to expect the debate to continue. While the COSO report will gain acceptance as a point of departure when
considering internal control issues, there will be debate over the details whenever there is a disagreement among participants as to the desirability of some
action bearing on internal controls. For example, a regulator under pressure to
accomplish some goal, such as the perceived protection of the general public,
may come to believe that a report by management, attested to be the auditor's,
will serve to create that protection. Whether the regulator is correct or has more
than political support for the position may be of less consequence than the need
to take action.
This is already evident in the recent banking regulation requirements for
reporting on compliance with laws and regulations. Adherents to the COSO
report may arrive at differing positions on the desirability of this particular
action. Those who desire to have such reports could take the position that
COSO addressed the standards for such reports, even though they provided
some cautions and no example reports. Others might believe that COSO was
more than cautionary in its concern for the expansion of external reporting in
this area and that, in fact, COSO would not support the extension of external
reporting in this area. Whatever the "facts" in this particular case, it would
appear that the regulations will stand and that the debate will move in the direc203

tion of limiting the laws and regulations to which the opinion will apply, specifying the detailed attestation work necessary and attempting to specify and limit
the risk exposure to the auditor, i.e., in large part dealing with those details of
measurement and risk not addressed by COSO in the area of external reporting
on compliance with laws and regulations.
As there are already many other such reports being prepared for internal or
limited use (for example, on environmental control matters), we might expect to
see a series of proposals for additional public disclosures. We can all think of
public interest groups that may find it worthwhile to push for such action.
The internal control debate is only one of many areas where the profession's
exposure has increased in recent years. There is little doubt that the profession
has had a long standing role with respect to the evaluation of internal controls.
However, since the enactment of the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practice Act), the
nature of that role has been expanding. FCPA opened up avenues for increased
service to clients in satisfying the requirements of that act. At the same time,
meeting this client service clearly opened up the potential for auditor attestation
exposure. For some time the profession resisted offering an external attestation
opinion on internal controls. It now appears that the profession supports some
form of external attestation report. The argument appears to be that the professionals are being held liable in any case, so let's do the work and get paid for
the risk. However, this is only one area of increased risk in the ever expanding
client service domain of the profession.
As the profession has moved or been pushed, depending upon your perspective, from its traditional franchise as the auditors of external financial reports to
client service organizations, its practitioners have found themselves caught in
the muddy waters of marketing essentially new services while attempting to
limit exposure. Unfortunately, one gets the impression that each service is opening up substantial, unanticipated exposures and that attempting to limit the
exposure is akin to holding back the tides. I have no solution. Perhaps limited
liability corporations and tort reform will help, but I am fearful that even with
such reform the profession is in danger of losing its franchise or being charged
so high a price for its franchise as to lose its business viability. Neither of these
results is in our interests or the interests of the broader society.
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